the fundamental problem with the theory of a japanese-american fifth columnAnother reason not to take your history from lazy nutcases:
"Championed by the brilliant, indomitable commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Pearl Harbor strike summed up Japan's basic strategy: a quick, limited war of conquest between India and the international date line, followed by a strategic defense and a negotiated peace with the Allies."
-- Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1994). 420.
"From January to March 1941, the principal planners of the United States Army and Navy met with their British counterparts and hammered out the broad contours of an allied strategy for victory in a war the United States had not yet entered...The major challenge was Hitler's Germany, for only Germany had the manpower, industrial might, and military capability to ensure an Axis victory. Italy and Japan could not long survive with Nazi Germany destroyed. The defeat of Germany, therefore, received the highest priority. The 'ABC-1 Staff Agreement' (March 1941) represented a military strategy that meshed with the established policies of the United States and Great Britain, i.e., that the course of world politics depended upon the mastery of Western Europe and the northern half of the Western Hemisphere. 'Germany First' would be the centerpiece of Allied strategy."
-- Ibid, 417-18.
Yeah, U.S. military planners were just frantic over the Japanese threat to the West Coast of the United States.